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Abstract Sybil attack can counterfeit traffic scenario by
sending false messages with multiple identities, which often
causes traffic jams and even leads to vehicular accidents in
vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). It is very difficult to
be defended and detected, especially when it is launched by
some conspired attackers using their legitimate identities.
In this paper, we propose an event based reputation sys-
tem (EBRS), in which dynamic reputation and trusted value
for each event are employed to suppress the spread of false
messages. EBRS can detect Sybil attack with fabricated
identities and stolen identities in the process of communica-
tion, it also defends against the conspired Sybil attack since
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Meanwhile, we keep the vehicle identity in privacy. Simu-
lation results show that EBRS is able to defend and detect
multi-source Sybil attacks with high performances.
Keywords Vehicular ad hoc network · Multi-source Sybil
attacks · Event reputation value · Event trusted value
1 Introduction
As an important part of Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tem (ITS), VANET has been developed rapidly in the past
twenty years. It purports to promote traffic management,
improve road safety and the quality of people’s travel expe-
rience [1]. In VANET, there are two communication models:
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication, as described in Fig. 1.
Different from the Delay-tolerant networks [2–4], the char-
acteristics of fast and dynamic topology, autonomous move-
ment and the influence of traffic rules, road and weather
conditions bring many security threats to VANET [5, 6]. To
deal with these threats, many applications of VANET give
each vehicle a unique identity, and take some security rules
and methods with these identities.
A legitimate identity gives a license for vehicle to act
as an internal node in VANET, but the identity-based secu-
rity is vulnerable to Sybil attack. It was first proposed by
Douceur [7] in the context of peer to peer networks. In
Sybil attack, the malicious node will play the role of multi-
ple distinct nodes to cheat the other vehicles, or destroy the
security rules with its multiple identities which are illegally
obtained by the way of forgery, theft or conspired shar-
ing. Sybil attack may bring serious threats to VANET. For
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Fig. 1 Architecture of VANET
example, sending false messages and fabricating traffic sce-
narios affect the normal travel [8]. In addition, Sybil attack-
ers can destroy some vote-based routing protocols, change
the voting results arbitrarily and even lead to DOS attacks
to impair the normal operations of data dissemination pro-
tocols [9] with the multiple identities. In a word, Sybil
attack will give the attackers many legitimate identities to
do bad things, such as blackhole attack , wormhole attack
and selective forwarding attack , replica attack [10–13], etc.
Currently, Sybil attack detection is an emerging research
area in VANET. Many methods are proposed, such as
RSSI-based (Received Signal Strength Indicator) detection
method [14–16], vehicle movement trajectory based method
[17, 18] and neighboring nodes information based method
[19]. But there are two things that make the existing meth-
ods cannot work well: one is conspired Sybil attack, in
which malicious vehicles obtain multiple false identities
through the way of forgery, stolen and share their identities
with the accomplices. The attackers have legitimate identi-
ties; the other is privacy requirement of anonymous [20, 21],
that makes the impostors more difficult to be found.
In this paper we present an event based reputation sys-
tem to defense Sybil attack, and we take multi-sources
of false identity into account. In order to protect privacy,
vehicle sends message with pseudonym instead of its real
identity. Through verifying the local certificate of vehicle,
EBRS can detect Sybil attack with forgery or theft identities.
Moreover, in order to defense conspired Sybil attack, EBRS
establishes a dynamic reputation value and trusted value
for the event in VANET. If the reputation value and trusted
value are below its corresponding threshold, the message
about the event can’t be spread, thus suppressing the prop-
agation of false information. The rest of paper is organized
as follows. In Section 2, a survey of existing Sybil attack
detection methods is given. The models and design goals
are given in Section 3. We propose EBRS in Section 4 and
system evaluation in Section 5. Finally in Section 6, we
conclude the paper and outline the future work.
2 Related work
Douceur [7] first described Sybil attack and proposed the
resource testing (RT) method for Sybil attack in P2P net-
works. The main idea of this method is that every node in
network is issued the same and limited resource such as
computation resource, communication resource and storage
capability. The verifier tests whether identities correspond
to different nodes by verifying that each identity has as
much of the tested resource as an independent node. As
Sybil attacker need to allocate resource to its Sybil nodes,
it can’t have the same ability as normal node. However, the
method of testing communication resource may cause chan-
nel congestion or even DOS attack. Moreover, resource test-
ing is not applicable for VANET as the malicious vehicles
may acquire multiple resource easily.
Newsome [22] established a taxonomy of different types
of Sybil attack and proposed several novel methods such as
radio resource testing (RRT), random key pre-distribution
(RKPD) and code attestation (CA) to defend against Sybil
attack in sensor network. Radio resource testing relies on
the assumption that any node has only one radio which is
incapable of sending or receiving on more than one channel
simultaneously, which is unsuitable for ad hoc network. In
random key pre-distribution, each sensor node is assigned
a random set of keys or key-related information. The basic
idea of code attestation is to exploit the fact that the code
running on a malicious node must be different from that on
a legitimate one. They are both not applicable for VANET
as it may have large number of nodes.
SybilGuard (SybilG.) use social network to defend
against Sybil attack [23–25]. Normal nodes will establish
trust relationship with its neighbors quickly by communicat-
ing with them. However, Sybil attackers can have multiple
false identities but it can’t fabricate the trust relationship
between Sybil nodes and honest nodes. Based on the fast
mixing property of social networks, the method limits the
corruptive influence of Sybil attacks. However, as vehi-
cles move autonomously in VANET, the frequent changing
topology brings a great challenge for using social network
to defend against Sybil attack.
Assuming that every Sybil attacker is rational, it launches
an attack only if its attack benefits are more than attack costs
[26, 27]. The economy analysis method (EAM) can discour-
age the scale of Sybil attack while recurring fee may inhibits
the initiative of normal nodes sending warning message to
others.
As each vehicle has only one identity and one identity
can’t be located at two positions, each relatively accurate
position has only one vehicle. Therefore, if the identity of
a node and its position are bound together, we would be
able to detect the Sybil attacks. Based on this idea, many
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Table 1 Comparison of related works, where S. is the abbrevia-
tion of static, 2S. indicates small scale, 3S. indicates static small
scale network, W. is the abbreviation of wireless and MANET is the
abbreviation of Mobile ad hoc network
Detection methods Applicable environment Communication Identities Simultaneity Conspired Sybil attack
Direct Indirect Fabricated Stolen Simul. Non-Simul.
RT [4] 2S. network   − −  × N/A
RSSI [11] W. network  × − − − − N/A
TSA [15] MANET  × − −  × N/A
SNI [16] MANET   − −  × N/A
RRT [19] 3S. network  ×    × N/A
RKPD [19] 3S. network  × − −  × N/A
CA [19] 2S. network       
SyiblG. [20] S. network  × − − × × N/A
EAM [23] S. network − − − − − − N/A
 indicates the detection method can detect corresponding Sybil attack. × means that the detection method can’t detect corresponding Sybil
attack. − means that the detection method haven’t nothing to do with that type of Sybil attack. N/A means that the method didn’t consider that
requirement
researchers proposed the method of estimating a node’s
position using RSSI to detect Sybil attack. If two messages
have the same estimated position, we conclude that they are
from the same node which is the Sybil attacker. Yu [14]
estimated nodes positions using predetermined signal prop-
agation model and RSSI to verify the accuracy of location
information. A node is considered suspect if its claimed
position is too far from the evaluated one. Bouassia [15]
estimated the RSSI range of next message using Friis Free
Space Path Loss Model [28]. If the real RSSI of next mes-
sage is out of this range, we regard the sender is a Sybil
vehicle. However, the message signal strength may be influ-
enced by complex road conditions, so the detection accuracy
is limited. What’s more, this method can’t defend against
conspired Sybil attack. Taking the autonomous movement
of vehicles into account, no vehicles will always pass by
the same road side unit (RSU) at the same time in a cer-
tain period of time and an independent vehicle can’t occur
at different RSU at the same time. Therefore, taking RSUs
as references, the vehicles generate their movement trajec-
tories. Through computing and comparing vehicles’ move-
ment trajectories, Sybil attack can be detected. In urban
VANET, there are fixed RSUs to provide extra service for
vehicles. By receiving and saving the signatures which were
broadcasted regularly by RSUs [17, 29] or actively request-
ing RSUs signatures [18] (also named as timestamp series
approach, TSA), vehicles obtain movement trajectories. In
V2V communications, vehicle has to send information with
its motion information. Vehicles with the same or similar
motion trajectory are Sybil attacker. However, this method
has the risk of leaking out vehicles motion information and
location privacy. Moreover, it can’t resist Sybil attack with
stolen movement trajectories and conspiracy Sybil attack.
Without consideration of traffic jam and vehicle fleet,
different vehicles will not always have the same neigh-
boring vehicles in a certain time period. Grover [19] put
forward a method to detect Sybil attack using the similar-
ity of neighboring information (SNI). Through exchanging
and computing neighboring information between different
vehicles, this method can detect Sybil attack. If some nodes
observe that they have similar neighbors for a significant
duration of time, these similar neighbors are identified as
Sybil nodes. Although it doesn’t need the help of RSU, the
reality of neighboring information inter-vehicles depends on
the loyalty of neighbor nodes. This can be used by the Sybil
attackers to launch a new Sybil attack.
According to the applicable environment and Sybil attack
taxonomy in [22] and the ability to defense against con-
spired Sybil attack, we make a comparison of the aforemen-
tioned Sybil attack detection methods in Table 1. We can see
that most detection methods are not applicable for VANET
for their impractical assumptions or high costs. RSSI-based
method is applicable for all the wireless networks. How-
ever, it has difficulty in distinguishing Sybil nodes and
normal nodes which are located near to each other. Vehicle
movement trajectory based method has the risk of revealing
vehicles location privacy. Neighboring nodes information
based method has an assumption that the majority of neigh-
bors are normal nodes which is a detection paradox itself.
What’s more, almost all the detection methods do not con-
sider conspired Sybil attacks. In this paper, according to the
false identity sources in Sybil attack and the characteristics
of VANET, we propose an event based reputation system
named EBRS which can protect vehicle privacy and defense
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Fig. 2 Faked smooth traffic
scenario by Sybil attack
against Sybil attack with multi-sources.
3 Models and design goals
3.1 System model
Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical architecture of VANET,
which consists of three interoperating components. In
VANET, each vehicle equips with an on board unit (OBU).
It is used for real-time traffic information collection, traffic
event perception, and warning messages acceptance. There
is an event table (ET) to store different events and a tamper-
proof device in OBU. RSU takes the role of a gateway
between vehicles and TA. It will generate local certificates
for vehicles in its communication range with an agreed ses-
sion key. Government department is responsible for the role
of trusted authority (TA). It takes charge of distributing and
storing the nodes information in VANET. In this paper, we
make the following assumptions. TA and RSU can never be
compromised by any attackers and they are always trusted.
The drivers can’t tamper OBU information arbitrarily. The
overlap area of RSUs is out of consideration of our work.
3.2 Attack model
To launch a Sybil attack successfully, a malicious node must
try to present as multiple independent identities. It can fab-
ricate traffic scenarios by sending false messages. Figure 2
shows the faked smooth traffic scenario launched by a Sybil
attacker. Normally, vehicle will send warning message to
notify other vehicles when it runs into traffic jam. Thus,
other vehicles can slow down or detour to another road.
However, Sybil attacker A might create the illusion of a
vehicle S passing the traffic congestion area smoothly, A
has the legitimate identity and it can share its identity with
the accomplices. Consequently, this action will impact the
judgment of other drivers. They may make wrong decisions,
leading the congestion area more congested or even vehi-
cles pile-up. This is a great threat to the lives and properties
of drivers and passengers. Similarly, in order to use the road
itself, Sybil attackers can send false information in the situ-
ation of smooth traffic. In this work, we are intent to solve
this Sybil attack related with sending false messages.
3.3 Design goals
To deal with the problems in existing Sybil attack detection
methods and above attack model, we present an event based
reputation system. Its design goals are:
– Conditional privacy preserving: vehicles use time-
limited pseudonyms in the V2V and V2I communica-
tions which preserves the identity privacy of vehicles.
But when a malicious vehicle is detected, TA has
the ability to retrieve the vehicle’s real identity from
its pseudo identity. Therefore, EBRS can prevent the
malicious node from repudiating its message.
– Independent detection: the essence of Sybil attack is
collaboration of multiple Sybil nodes. To prevent the
potential Sybil attack from happening again, the Sybil
attack detection method should be carried by vehicles
independently.
– Defense against Sybil attack with multiple false identity
sources: Sybil attacker can get multiple false identi-
ties using the method of forgery, theft and conspiracy,
EBRS is capable of defensing and detecting all theses
Sybil attacks.
4 Event based reputation system
4.1 Initialization and notation
TA takes charge of the task of system initialization. Accord-
ing to the definition of bilinear maps, let G1 be a cyclic
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Table 2 Notations
Notations Descriptions
PIDv Pseudonym of vehicle v
PKv/skv Public/secret key of vehicle v
PKr/skr Public/secret key of RSU r
Lcertrv//Lcertvr Local certificate of vehicle v in the
range of RSU r
Certr Certificate of RSU r
T Fresh time of local certificate
RVE Reputation value of event E
T VE Trusted value of event E
TE Time of event E
LE Location of event E
Type(E) Type of event E
additive group which is generated by P and G2 be a cyclic
multiplicative group. G1 and G2 have the same prime order
q. P is the generator and P ∈ G1. TA chooses a random
number s as its prime secret key and it will update this key
periodically. TA pre-distributes a unique ID, secret key, hash
function hash : {0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗q and s to the vehicle who
wants to join in VANET. TA assigns a secret key and certifi-
cate to each RSU. The main notations throughout this paper
are shown in Table 2.
4.2 EBRS process
EBRS establishes a local certificate for every vehicle and
dynamic reputation value and trusted value for every event
in VANET.
4.2.1 Process of local certificate generation
Before communicating with other nodes, a vehicle has to
establish a local certificate with its local RSU. The pro-
cess of local certificate generation is as follows, it can be
depicted as Fig. 3.
1. According to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algo-
rithm, vehicle Vi obtains its public key PKi and
pseudonym PIDi through computing PKi = ski ·
P mod n and PIDi = hash(PKi‖s). Then it sends
PKi and PIDi to its local RSU r .
2. After receiving the information, local RSU r will store
the information and send it to TA to validate PKi and
PIDi .
3. If PKi or PIDi has not passed TA verification, RSU r
will break off the process of local certificate generation
forcibly. Otherwise, TA will send confirm information
to RSU r . After receiving confirmation, RSU will com-
pute its public key PKr , session key SKri with Vi and
V ′i s local certificate Lcertri using the following for-
mulas. After that, it will send (PKr, Certr , T ) to Vi
and put (P IDi, SKri, Lcertri , T ) into its certificate
list (CL).
PKr = skr · P mod n (1)
SKri = PKr ⊕ PKi mod n (2)
HVri = hash(P IDi ||Certr ) (3)
Lcertri = HVri × SKri mod n (4)
4. After receiving the message from RSU r , A will com-
pute its session key SKir with RSU r , HVir and its
local certificate Lcertir using the following formulas.
Under normal circumstances, SKir = SKri,HVir =
HVri, Lcertir = Lcertri .
SKir = PKi ⊕ PKr mod n (5)
HVir = hash(P IDi ||Certr ) (6)
Lcertir = HVir × SKir mod n (7)
4.2.2 Process of local certificate validation
After vehicle Vi receives its local certificate, it can com-
municate with other vehicles. Assumed that there is a
traffic accident in front of Vi , it will broadcast a warn-
ing message to its neighbors. The format of this mes-
sage is (P IDi, ESKir (Lcertir ),M,HMi), where M =
Fig. 3 Process of local
certificate generation
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Fig. 4 Process of local
certificate validation
(LE, TE, T ype(E), RVE, T VE), HMi is the hash value of
M . When vehicle Vj (supposing it is in the range of Vi)
receives the warning message from Vi , it has to validate
if Vi is a normal vehicle in VANET. The main process of
validation is as follows, it can be formalized as Fig. 4.
1. Vj will send (P IDi, ESKir (Lcertir )) to its local RSU
r to authenticate the certificate of Vi .
2. RSU r will search its CL to get the session key with Vi
using PIDi . If formula 8 is satisfied and the certificate
is within its fresh time T , the pseudonym and local cer-
tificate of Vi is being proved to be correct. RSU r will
send the confirm message to Vj .
DSKri (ESKir (Lcertir )) = Lcertir = Lcertri (8)
3. Once receiving the confirmation message, Vj will
authenticate the integrity of message using formula 9.
If it is satisfied, Vj will record RVE and T VE or build
an event entry in its ET. Otherwise, it will ignore the
message from Vi .
HMj = hash(M) = HMi (9)
There may be three reasons for the warning message
not passing the validation of RSU. 1) Vi attempts to use
both expired pseudonym and certificate, with pseudonym
and certificate in hand to communicate with other vehicles
which leads to a Sybil attack; 2) A malicious node attempts
to use the pseudonym stealing from Vi to launch a Sybil
attack but it doesn’t get the session key of Vi with RSU r;
3) A malicious vehicle attempts to launch Sybil attack by
forging a pseudonym and session key. In this case, RSU r
will issue a warning message about Sybil attack and report
to TA who can trace the malicious vehicle’s real identity.
4.2.3 Process of setting event reputation value and trusted
value
To deal with the problem of Sybil attack sending false mes-
sages, EBRS is enlightened by [30] to build a dynamic rep-
utation value and trusted value for every event in VANET.
Event reputation value is defined as the times of a vehicle
sensing the event and the event trusted value is the number
of distinct vehicles who have sensed the event. If vehicle Vi
senses an event Ej for the first time, it will build an event
entry for this event in its ET. At the same time, Vi will
broadcast a warning message to its neighbors. After receiv-
ing this warning message, Vk (supposing it is in the range
of Vi) will establish an event entry in its ET for this event if
it hasn’t sensed this event before. Otherwise, it will update
the reputation value and trusted value of this event. When
the reputation value and trusted value of this event both
reach its corresponding threshold, Vk will notify its driver
through the user interface in OBU. The driver will take
some actions about this event. Meanwhile, Vk will broad-
cast a warning message about this event to its neighbors.
If Vi is a Sybil attacker who sends false message, its subse-
quent vehicles will not sense the event as it doesn’t happen.
Therefore, RVE and T VE will not reach their thresholds.
Thus it inhibits the dissemination of false message. Suppos-
ing that Vj is an accomplice of Vi , they plan to launch a
Sybil attack. As they can’t change RVE , the event reputa-
tion value can’t reach its threshold. Thus the false message
Table 3 Simulation parameters
Parameters Values
Simulation time 500s
Vehicles velocity 10m/s − 30m/s
Communication range 300m
MAC protocol 802.11p
Sending frequency 1 per second
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Fig. 5 Communication delay
will not be spread any longer, EBRS defends against the
conspired Sybil attack. In Sybil attack with stolen identi-
ties, although the Sybil attacker can send false message with
legitimate identity, the false message can’t be spread any
longer as the event reputation value and trusted valued can’t
reach their thresholds. In order to respond and transmit the
message quickly which is very perilous and urgent, we can
define different threshold for different type of event.
5 System evaluation
In this section, we analyze and evaluate the performance of
EBRS. In our simulation, vehicles move according to the
street map in the Houston area based on a Tiger database
file. In this map, there are 383 points and 1,188 road seg-
ments in total. We have evaluated our method in 2 km
Fig. 6 Delivery ratio
Fig. 7 Delivery ratio in different conditions
road segment area obtained from these realistic traces with
variation the number of vehicles. The simulation is based
on NS2 which is an object-oriented, time-discrete network
simulation tool. It can present many well-developed low-
layer protocols with its easy programming interfaces. The
simulation parameter is shown in Table 3.
5.1 Simulation results analysis
Figure 5 is the communication delay of EBRS and TSA
with different packet size, 1 packet and 0.5 packet respec-
tively, from which we can conclude that the communication
delay of EBRS is much less than TSA. With the increase
of vehicle density, the communication delay will increase.
This is because that too many vehicles on the road will cause
intense competition of wireless channel in the process of
Fig. 8 Average event reputation value and event trusted value
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Fig. 9 Average number of affected vehicles by false event and real
event
communication. In addition, the bigger the packet is, the
higher will be the communication delay. The delivery ratio
of EBRS and TSA is shown by Fig. 6. It indicates that when
the vehicle density is small, the message delivery ratio is
small, too. The reason is that when the number of vehicles
on the road is little, the distance between vehicles will be
too far to receive the message. With the increase of node
density, the delivery ratio will increase, too. But when the
number of vehicles is above 100, the delivery ratio will be
decreased. As more vehicles on the road, they will send mes-
sage at the same time which leads to the increase of packets
loss. From these figures, we can conclude that our method
is much better than TSA.
We have made a simulation to study the influence of
Sybil attack to the packet delivery ratio in VANET. At the
same time, the effect of our method against Sybil attack is
also studied. From Fig. 7, we can see that our method has
good effect to reduce the impact of Sybil attack. The rea-
son is that in our method, Sybil attack can be defended by
the process of local certificate generation and validation.
What’s more, the false events sent by Sybil attackers can be
prevented to transmit to normal vehicles. While in VANET
without Sybil attack detection or defense method, the deliv-
ery ratio falls sharply. Therefore, it is very necessary to
study the method to deal with Sybil attack.
To study the impact of event reputation value and event
trusted value on EBRS, Fig. 8 shows the event reputation
value and trusted value with the increase of simulation time.
We suppose that the sampling interval of OBU is 1 s and
range of sensor is 20 m. The event of traffic jam is happened
at the 50th s. If the event reputation value doesn’t change in
10 s, it will be decreased 1 per 20 s. When the event repu-
tation value is 0, it will be deleted from the event table. As
is shown in Fig. 9, the event reputation value and trusted
value increases with the simulation time from the 50th to
the 300th s. When the event is resolved at the 300th s,
the corresponding values will decrease. We set the reputa-
tion threshold to 10 and trust value threshold to 4 of traffic
jam. A vehicle trusting the existence of an event is defined
as an affected vehicle. If there is a conspired Sybil attack
in VANET, the malicious node will send false event to its
neighbors. From Fig. 9, we can conclude that EBRS can pre-
vent the spread of false event successfully. On the contrary,
the real event can be spread quickly to many vehicles. As
a result, EBRS defends against the conspired Sybil attack
sending false message.
5.2 Performance evaluation
Table 4 gives the comparison of our method and some
related work in Section 2. It indicates that our method
can not only preserve vehicle privacy, guarantee message
integrity, but also can defense against Sybil attack with mul-
tiple false identity sources. The marks in this table have the
same meaning with Table 1.
The comparison of V2V communication overhead and
V2I communication overhead of TSA and our method is
given in Fig. 10. In TSA, not only message, but also the
latest timestamp certificate and RSU certificate are needed
to be concluded in the communication packet. Therefore,
the communication overhead of TSA is much bigger than
Table 4 Comparison of our
method and other methods Detection Sybil attack Sybil attack Conspired Message Privacy
methods with fabricated identities with stolen identities Sybil attack integrity protection
RSSI [11] − − N/A N/A N/A
TSA [15] − − N/A  ×
SNI [16] − − N/A N/A ×
Our method     
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Fig. 10 Comparison of communication overhead
our method. Assume that the length of message in two
methods is 20 bytes. The traffic message length of V2V
communication in TSA is len(T M1) and the V2V commu-
nication overhead in our method is len(T M2). They can be
computed as follows.
len(T M1)
= len(m) + len(Sig) + len(Cert T ) + len(Cert R)
= 20 bytes + 28 bytes + 107 bytes + 70 bytes
= 225 bytes. (10)
len(T M2)
= len(m) + len(P ID) + len(Enc) + len(hash)
= 20 bytes + 20 bytes + 32 bytes + 20 bytes
= 92 bytes. (11)
When passing by RSU, each vehicle needs to request a
new timestamp certificate. The length of requesting mes-
sage in TSA is len(Req1):
len(Req1)
= len(PK) + len(Sig) + len(Cert T ) + len(Cert R)
= 21 bytes + 28 bytes + 107 bytes + 70 bytes
= 226 bytes. (12)
Vehicle in EBRS only needs to send its pseudonym and
public key to request a new certificate. The V2I communi-
cation overhead in EBRS is len(Req2):
len(Req2) = len(P ID) + len(PK)
= 20 bytes + 21 bytes
= 41 bytes. (13)
6 Conclusion and future work
Compared to existing methods, EBRS can defense against
multi-source Sybil attacks, ensure the integrity of message
and preserve the privacy of vehicles. By establishing a repu-
tation threshold and trust threshold for each event message,
the dissemination of false message is restricted no matter it
is from forgery identities or legitimate identities. In EBRS,
a trusted RSU is used to issue the certificate of vehicles
in its communication range. Our further work will loosen
the strong security assumption of RSU, and try to find an
automatic mode to establish the trust relationship among the
participant vehicles.
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